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Comparative Bullet lead Analysis: A 
Retrospective 
Paul C. Giannelli* 
For over thirty years, FBI experts testified about comparative bullet 
lead analysis (CBLA), a technique that was first used in the investiga-
tion into President Kennedy's assassination.1 CBLA compares trace 
chemicals found in bullets at crime scenes with ammunition found in 
the possession of a suspect. 2 This technique was used by the FBI 
when firearms ("ballistics") identification could not be employed-for 
example, if the weapon was not recovered or the bullet was too 
mutilated for comparison purposes. · 
Although the FBI eventually ceased using CBLA, the Bureau's 
conduct in first employing the technique and then defending it after it 
was challenged provides an insight into how forensic science 
sometimes works. 
A. The Technique 
FBI experts used various analytical techniques (first, neutron activa-
tion analysis (NAA), and then inductively coupled plasma-atomic emis-
sion spectrometry (ICP-AES)) to determine the concentrations of seven 
elements-arsenic, antimony, tin, copper, bismuth, silver, and 
cadmium-in the bullet lead alloy of both the crime-scene and 
suspect's bullets. Statistical tests were then used to compare the ele-
ments in each bullet and determine whether the fragments and 
suspect's bullets were "analytically indistinguishable" for each of the 
elemental concentration means. Exactly what the phrase "analytically 
indistinguishable" meant was the critical issue-i.e., did such a finding 
mean that the bullet fragments came from a small or large universe? 
The probative value of the test results would, of course, differ if only a 
hundred bullets had the same chemical composition as opposed to 
several million bullets. 
*Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case 
Western Reserve University. This column is based in part on P. Giannelli & E. 
lmwinkelried, Scientific Evidence (4th ed. 2007). Reprinted with permission. 
1See generally Erik Randich & Patrick M. Grant, Proper Assessment of the JFK 
Assassination Bullet Lead Evidence from Metallurgical and Statistical Perspectives, 51 
J. Forensic Sci. 717 (2006) (discussing the original analysis of the bullet fragments). 
~he overwhelming majority of cases were homicide prosecutions, some of 
which were capital cases. Because there are few federal homicide statutes, CBLA 
evidence was most commonly used in state prosecutions. 
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B. The Challenge 
The technique was not seriously challenged until a retired FBI 
examiner, William Tobin, began questioning the procedure in scientific 
and legal journals3 and in court testimony as well.4 These challenges 
apparently lead one FBI expert, Kathleen Lundy, to testify falsely. In 
Commonwealth v. Ragland,5 a Kentucky murder case, she stated at a 
pretrial admissibility hearing that the elemental composition of a .243 
caliber bullet fragment removed from the victim's body was analytically 
indistinguishable from bullets found at the home of the defendant's 
parents. 6 Lundy further testified that the Winchester Company 
purchased its bullet lead in block form prior to 1996 and then remelted 
it at its manufacturing plant. However, during cross-examination at 
trial, Lundy admitted that she knew prior to the pretrial hearing that 
Winchester had purchased its lead in billet form in 1994.7 This was 
not a minor point. Millions more bullets could have the same "source" 
if they were last melted by a secondary smelter instead of by 
Winchester.8 Lundy subsequently admitted to her superiors that she 
had lied, 9 and on June 17, 2003, she pleaded guilty to testifying falsely 
3See Edward J. lmwinkelried & William A. Tobin, Comparative Bullet Lead 
Analysis (CBLA) Evidence: Valid Inference or Ipse Dixit?, 28 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 43 
(2003); Erik Randich et al., A Metallurgical Review of the Interpretation of Bullet Lead 
Compositional Analysis, 127 Forensic Sci. lnt'l 174 (2002) (Tobin was a coauthor); 
William A. Tobin & Wayne Duerfeldt, How Probative is Comparative Bullet Lead 
Analysis?, 17 Grim. Just. 26 (Fall 2002). 
4E.g., Ragland v. Com., 191 S.W.3d 569, 577 (Ky. 2006); Clemons v. State, 392 
Md. 339, 896 A.2d 1059, 1070 (2006); State v. Behn, 375 N.J. Super. 409, 868 A.2d 
329, 339-40 (App. Div. 2005) (Tobin's affidavit submitted). Although a metallurgist, 
Tobin worked in a different section of the lab. 
5Ragland v. Com., 191 S.W.3d 569, 580 (Ky. 2006). 
6See Dan Eggen, FBI Lab Moves to New Home, Wash. Post, Apr. 25, 2003, at 
A21; New Allegations Target DNA, Bullet Analysis at FBI Lab, Associated Press, Apr. 
23, 2003 ("Weeks after testifying at a court hearing in a Kentucky murder, FBI 
scientist Kathleen Lundy told her superiors a secret. She knowingly gave false 
testimony about her specialty of lead bullet analysis."); Joseph Gerth, Ragland 
Prosecutor Can Stay on Case, Courier-Journal, Oct. 19, 2002, at 1B. 
7 Ragland, 191 S.W.3d at 580 ("During cross-examination at trial, Lundy admit-
ted that her testimony at the Daubert hearing was false and that she knew prior to the 
Daubert hearing that Winchester purchased its bullet lead in billets in 1994. Her only 
explanation for her false testimony was that she had misunderstood the question. 
When defense counsel read the questions and answers to her from a transcript, she 
asserted that she could not remember if that was, in fact, her testimony."). 
8Ragland, 191 S.W.3d at 576-77. 
9See Charles Pillar & Robin Mejia, Science Casts Doubt on FBI's Bullet Evidence, 
L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 2003 ("In a sworn affidavit, she admitted that her trial testimony 
was untruthful and that the manufacturing batch was many times larger than she had 
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and was sentenced to a suspended ninety-day jail sentence and a 
$250 fine.10 
As a result of Tobin's testimony, the FBI asked the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) to review the technique. NAS appointed a 
committee of scientists, statisticians, and attorneys to conduct the 
review. 11 
C. The NAS Report 
One of the first things the NAS Committee discovered was the 
disparate (often inconsistent) interpretive conclusions provided by FBI 
experts in the reported cases. In some, experts testified only that two 
exhibits were "analytically indistinguishable."12 In other cases, examin-
ers concluded that samples could have come from the same "source" 
or "batch."13 In still others, they stated that the samples came from the 
same source.14 The testimony in numerous cases went much further 
and referred to a "box" of ammunition. For example, tWo specimens: 
• Could have come from the same box, 15 
• Could have come from the same box or a box manufactured on 
the same day, 16 
• Were consistent with their having come from the same box of 
ammunition, 17 
suggested. . . . Lundy blamed her conduct partly on a sense of crisis in her work, fed 
by 'new and repeated challenges to the validity of the science associated with bullet 
lead comparison analysis.' "). 
10Mark Pitsch, Ex-FBI Scientist Pleads Guilty, Courier-Journal, June 18, 2003, at 
1 B. See also Steve Bailey, Defense Attorneys Want Prosecutors Disqualified, Associ-
ated Press, Sept. 6, 2002 ("Attorneys for both sides were in court for a hearing in 
which FBI ballistics expert Kathleen Lundy was scheduled to testify about lying during 
a preliminary hearing in Shane Ragland's murder case."); Maurice Possley, Study 
Shoots Holes in Bullet Analysis by FBI, Chi. Trib., Feb. 11,2004, at C14. 
11National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Forensic Analysis: 
Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence 6 (2004). The author served on the NAS Committee. 
12See Wilkerson v. State, 139 Md. App. 557, 776 A.2d 685, 689 (2001). 
13See State v. Krummacher, 269 Or. 125, 523 P.2d 1009, 1012-13 (1974). 
14See U.S. v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 673-74, 46 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 189 (8th Cir. 
1996); People v. Lane, 256 Ill. App. 3d 38, 195 Ill. Dec. 218, 628 N.E.2d 682, 689-90 
(1st Dist. 1993). 
15See State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 817 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Jones v. State, 
425 N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ind. 1981). 
16 See State v. Grube, 126 Idaho 377, 883 P.2d 1069, 1078 (1994); People v. 
Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 170, 102 Ill. Dec. 342, 499 N.E.2d 1355, 1366 (1986). 
17See State v. Reynolds, 307 N.C. 184, 297 S.E.2d 532, 534, 31 A.L.R.4th 473 
(1982). 
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• Probably came from the same box, 18 and 
• Must have come from the same box or from another box that 
would have been made by the same company on the same day.19 
Testimony that two specimens came from the same box of ammuni-
tion (usually 50 loaded cartridges, sometimes 20) is powerful evidence. 
Several other (and different) statements appear in the published 
opinions. An early case reported that the specimens "had come from 
the same batch of ammunition: they had been made by the same 
manufacturer on the same day and at the same hour." 20 One case 
reports the expert's conclusion with a statistic. 21 In another case, the 
expert used the expressions "rare finding"22 and "a very rare finding."23 
In still another case, the expert "opined that the same company 
produced the bullets at the same time, using the same lead source. 
Based upon Department of Justice records, she opined that an 
overseas company called PMC produced the bullets around 1982."24 
These inconsistencies suggest that the FBI laboratory was not 
monitoring the trial testimony of its experts. 
The publication of the NAS Report in 2004 undercut much of this 
testimony. According to the report, "The available data do not support 
any statement that a crime bullet came from a particular box of 
ammunition. ln particular, references to 'boxes' of ammunition in any 
18 . See Bryan v. State, 935 P.2d 338, 360, 1997 OK CR 15 (Okla. Grim. App. 
1997). 
19See U.S. v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 666-67, 46 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 189 (8th Cir. 
1996) ("An expert testified that such a finding is rare and that the bullets must have 
come from the same box or from another box that would have been made by the 
same company on the same day."); Com. v. Daye, 411 Mass. 719, 587 N.E.2d 194, 
207 (1992); State v. King, 353 N.C. 457, 546 S.E.2d 575, 584 (2001) (Kathleen 
Lundy "opined that, based on her lead analysis, the bullets she examined either came 
from the same box of cartridges or came from different boxes of the same caliber, 
manufactured at the same time."). 
20Brown v. State, 601 P.2d 221, 224 (Alaska 1979) (emphasis added). 
21Earhart v. State, 823 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Grim. App. 1991). 
22U.S. v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 666, 46 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 189 (8th Cir. 1996). 
23Davis, 103 F.3d at 667. 
24People v. Vil/arta, 2002 WL 66887 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 2002) (murder). In 
recent years, the testimony became more limited. A 2002 FBI publication states the 
conclusion as follows: "Therefore, they likely originated from the same manufacturer's 
source (melt) of lead." Charles A. Peters, The Basis for Compositional Bullet Lead 
Comparisons, 4 Forensic Sci. Comm. No. 3, at 5 (July 2002) (emphasis added). 
Testimony to the same effect has also been proffered. Testimony of Charles Peters, 
Commonwealth v. Wilcox, Kentucky, Feb. 28, 2002, Transcript (trial testimony): "Well, 
bullets that are analytically indistinguishable likely come from the same molten lead 
sources of lead, uh, as opposed to bullets that have different composition come from 
different, uh, melts of lead." 
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form should be avoided as misleading under Federal Rule of Evidence 
403. "25 The most disturbing case is State v. Earhart, 26 a capital murder 
case in which the CBLA evidence apparently played a significant 
role. 27 The transcript contains the following expert testimony: "We 
can-from my 21 years experience of doing bullet lead analysis and 
doing research on boxes of ammunition down though the years I can 
determine if bullets came from the same box of ammunition . . ."28 
However, according to the NAS Committee the amount of bullets that 
can be produced from a melt "can range from the equivalent of as few 
as 12,000 to as many as 35 million 40 grain, .22 caliber longrifle 
bullets." 29 Earhart was executed before the NAS Report was 
published.30 
In 2003, a federal district court excluded CBLA evidence under the 
Daubert standard.31 This was apparently the first case to rule such 
evidence inadmissible. 
25National Research Council, supra note 11, at 7. 
26Earhart v. State, 823 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Grim. App. 1991) ("He concluded 
that the likelihood that two .22 caliber bullets came from the same batch, based on a// 
the .22 bullets made in one year, is approximately .000025 percent, 'give or take a 
zero.' He subsequently acknowledged, however, that the numbers which he used to 
reach the .000025 percent statistic failed to take into account that there are different 
types of .22 caliber bullets made each year - .22, .22 long, and .22 long rifle. Agent 
Riley ultimately testified that there could be several hundred thousand bullets per 
batch, but with some variation in the elemental composition within the batch.") 
(emphasis added). 
27 See Earhart v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1062, 1068 (5th Cir. 1998) (denying habeas 
relief, the court referred to "the significant role the bullet evidence played in the 
prosecution's case"). 
28Testimony of John Riley, State v. Earhart, No. 4064, Dist. Ct. Lee County, 21st 
Judicial Dist., Texas, Transcript at 5248-49. See also id. at 5258 ("Well, bullets that 
are - that have analytically indistinguishable compositions or compositions that are 
generally similar typically are found within the same box of ammunition and that is the 
case that we have here. Now, bullets that are the same composition can also be 
found in other boxes of ammunition, but it's most lil<ely those boxes would have been 
manufactured at the same place on or about the same date.''). But see testimony of 
Charles Peters, FBI examiner, Commonwealth v. Wilcox, Kentucky, Feb. 28, 2002 
(Daubert hearing: "We have never testified, to my knowledge, that that bullet came 
from that box. We'd never say that. All we are testifying is that that bullet, or that 
victim fragment or something, the bullet, either came from that box or the many boxes 
that were produced at the same time." Transcript at 1-2.) (emphasis added). 
29National Research Council, supra note 11, at 6. 
30See Death Penalty Information Center, Searchable Database of Executions, 
http:/ /www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions (search for "Earhart" under "Find 
Person" search box) (last visited Dec. 28, 2010). 
31 U.S. v. Mikos, 2003 WL 22922197 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
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D. Withholding Data 
Much of the FBI testimony rested on a database that the Bureau 
had built up over the course of many years. Although the NAS Com-
mittee frequently asked for this data during its year-long investigation, 
the FBI did not turn over the data until it was too late to include an 
analysis of the information in its report. 32 Karen Kafadar and Cliff H. 
Spiegelman, the two statisticians who served on the NAS Committee, 
would later write that their subsequent inspection of the data "identi-
fied several peculiarities."33 First, the database was incomplete. The 
FBI claimed to have a "complete data file" of some 71 ,000+ measure-
ments but only 64,869 were turned over. Moreover, only measure-
ments made by ICP-AES were included; a different analytical method, 
NAA, haq been used before 1997. Both techniques measured the 
same elements, and therefore the results from either technique would 
have been suitable for comparison. Further, the numbering system for 
the bullets was "highly inconsistent and rather unexpected," suggest-
ing that some bullet measurements had been deleted.34 Additionally, "a 
rough investigation of the measurement error indicated many measure-
ment errors that exceeded the FBI's claimed analytical precision of 
2-5%."35 Finally, "only 15% of the 1,079 cases listed in these two files 
had measurements from [National Institute of Standards and T echnol-
ogy] ... [,] making it impossible to determine the frequency of 
32See Cliff H. Spiegelman & Karen Kafadar, Data Integrity and the Scientific 
Method: The Case for Bullet Lead Data as Forensic Evidence, 19:2 Chance 16, 22 
(2006) ("During the open sessions of the committee meetings, the FBI claimed to have 
a 'complete data file' of some 71 ,000+ measurements. Following repeated requests 
from the Committee, the FBI submitted at its last meeting a CD-ROM that contained 
two data files with a combined total of 64,869 bullet (not 71 ,000+) measurement 
records. . . . This data set could not be analyzed in time for the release of the report 
... "). 
33Spiegelman & Kafadar, supra note 32. 
34Spiegelman & Kafadar, supra note 32 ("[nhe numbering system of the bullets 
was highly inconsistent and rather unexpected, e.g., the bullets from a suspect in a 
particular case might be numbered 013A, 013B, 013C, 014A, 014B, 014C, ... , 
leading one to wonder what happened to bullets 001, 002, ... , 012."). Other il-
lustrations of incomplete data were noted: "[W]hile most of the bullets indicated 3 
measurements, about 30 bullets had six or more measurements." ld. "[O]nly about 
50% of the bullets in this data set were identified as having come from one of the four 
major bullet manufacturers in the United States (Cascade Cartridge, Inc.; Federal; 
Remington; Winchester); the 'complete data file' of 71,000 bullets may yield a higher 
proportion of bullets from these four manufacturers." ld. 
35Spiegelman & Kafadar, supra note 32. 
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'matches'" in some cases.36 Accordingly, the "missing data and the 
inconsistent precisions" undermined the Bureau's public claims.37 
As researchers steeped in the traditions of science, Kafadar and 
Spiegelman were puzzled by the FBI's failure to disclose this data. 
They wrote: "The scientific method is important for science generally; 
forensic science is no exception. . . . [T]he evidence in this paper 
suggest that, at least tor [CBLA], forensic science tailed in the require-
ment to share the material, methods and data to reach conclusions 
with the scientific community."38 
In short, the NAS Committee, appointed at the behest of and funded 
by the FBI, was not provided with critical data that would have as-
sisted it in evaluating the technique. This data formed the basis of the 
Bureau's testimony in about 500 pr_osecutions, including death penalty 
cases.39 
E. 66SiJ:PDII'illl'ilD/J'il$2t Uoe Sdem;e 
The FBI's response to the NAS Report was also disconcerting. The 
Bureau quickly put out a press release, obscuring the report's findings. 
The release highlighted the NAS Committee's conclusion that the FBI 
was using appropria_te instrumentation and the correct elements for 
comparison. Yet these aspects of CBLA were not the ones in question. 
Rather, the interpretation of the data was the disputed issue. Only one 
sentence in the press release addressed this important issue: "Recom-
mendations by the [NAS] include suggestions to improve the statisticai 
analysis, quality control procedures, as well as expert testimony."40 
The news media read the report quite differently - e.g., "Study Shoots 
Holes in Bullet Analysis By FBI," 41 "Report Finds Flaws,"42 "Panel 
36Spiegelman & Kafadar, supra note 32. 
37 Spiegelman & Kafadar, supra note 32. 
38Spiegelman & l<afadar, supra note 32, at 22-23. 
39See Paui C. Gianneiii, Wrongtui Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to 
Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 163, 198-203 (2007) (discussing CBLA). 
40Department of Justice, FBI News Release, Feb. 10, 2004. 
41 fV1aurice Possley, Study Shoots Holes in Bullet Analysis By FBI, Chi. Trib., Feb. 
11, 2004, at 14. 
42Charles Pillar, Report Finds Flaws in FBI Bullet Analysis; Changes are Proposed 
for the Technique Often Cited in Expert Testimony in Criminal Trials, L.A. Times, Feb. 
11, 2004, at 12. 
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Questions FBI Bullet Analysis,"43 and "Report Questions the Reliability 
of an F.B.I. Ballistics Test."44 
The Bureau also included the following passage in the press release: 
"The basis of bullet lead compositional analysis is supported by ap-
proximately 50 peer-reviewed articles found in scientific publications 
beginning in the early 1970's. Published research and validation stud-
ies have continued to demonstrate the usefulness of the measure-
ments of trace elements within bullet lead."45 In contrast, the NAS 
Report pointed out that there were "very few peer-reviewed articles 
on homogeneity and the rate of false positive matches" and "outside 
reviews have only recently been published."46 In effect, the FBI cherry-
picked favorable statements from the report and . downplayed the 
unfavorable crucial findings. 
Over a year after the release of the NAS study, the FBI discontinued 
CBLA testing,47 issuing another slanted press release. Once again, the 
release minimized the problems, citing the following reason for its 
decision: "While the FBI Laboratory still firmly supports the scientific 
foundation of bullet lead analysis, given the costs of maintaining the 
equipment, the resources necessary to do the examination, and its 
relative probative value, the FBI Laboratory has decided that it will no 
longer conduct this exam."48 Nevertheless, a month earlier, Dwight 
Adams, the laboratory director, had written a memorandum to the FBI 
Director specifying different reasons for abandoning the technique, 
including the following comments: (1) "We cannot afford to be mislead-
ing to a jury" and (2) "We plan to discourage prosecutors from using 
our previous results in future cases."49 Neither concern was reflected 
in the press release. 
In the wake of the National Academy's report, several state courts 
excluded CBLA evidence.50 Surprisingly, the FBI supplied affidavits in 
several cases supporting prosecutors' efforts to sustain convictions 
43Randolph E. Schmid, Panel Questions FBI Bullet Analysis, Associated Press, 
Feb. 10, 2004. 
44Eric Lichtblau, Report Questions the Reliability of an F.B.I. Ballistics Test, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 11, 2004, at 22. 
45FBI News Release, supra note 40. 
46National Research Council, supra note 11, at 100. 
47Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Abandons Disputed Test for Bullets From Crime Scene, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 2005, at A 12. 
48Department of Justice, FBI News Release, Sept. 1, 2005. 
49John Solomon, FBI's Forensic Test Full of Holes, Wash. Post, Nov. 18, 2007, at 
A1. 
50See Ragland v. Com., 191 S.W.3d 569, 580 (Ky. 2006) (noting that "[i]f the FBI 
Laboratory that produced the CBLA evidence now considers such evidence to be of 
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based on the technique. In one affidavit, the FBI cited the Academy's 
report but failed to mention that the report had faulted the Bureau's 
statistical methods. The chair of the NAS Committee criticized the af-
fidavit because it did "not discuss the statistical bullet-matching 
technique, which is key and probably the most significant scientific 
flaw found by the committee." 51 The affidavit was also misleading 
because it estimated that the maximum number of .22-caliber bullets 
in a batch of lead was 1.3 million, when the NAS Committee found that 
the number could be as high as 35 million.52 
On November i8, 2007, 60 Minutes aired a segment on CBLA. In 
an interview for 60 Minutes, the FBI lab director, now retired, 
acknowledged that testimony about boxes was "misleading and 
inappropriate."53 That broadcast, along with a Washington Post 
investigation, called into question the FBI's response to the NAS 
Report. The main problem was that only the FBI had records of all the 
cases in which its experts had testified, and the Bureau had declined 
to disclose the names of those cases. 54 Instead, the· ·Bureau relied on 
the NAS Report, its own press releases, and pro forma letters sent to 
prosecution and defense organizations to notify defendants that the 
prosecution experts had relied upon faulty science. Yet the letters 
neither highlighted the problem, nor its significance, and therefore 
were grossly inadequate means of communication, especially for 
insufficient reliability to justify continuing to produce it, a finding by the trial court that 
the evidence is both scientifically reliable and relevant would be clearly erroneous"); 
Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339, 896 A.2d I 059, I 070, I 078 (2006) ("CBLA is not 
admissible under the Frye-Reed standard because it is not generally accepted within 
the scientific community as valid and reliable."; "Based on the criticism of the 
processes and assumptions underlying CBLA, we determine that the trial court erred 
in admitting expert testimony based on CBLA because of the lack of general ac-
ceptance of the process in the scientific community."); State v. Behn, 375 N.J. Super. 
409, 868 A.2d 329, 331 (App. Div. 2005) (finding the technique was "based on er-
roneous scientific foundations"). 
But see Com. v. Fisher, 582 Pa. 276, 870 A.2d 864, 871 (2005) ("The CBAL 
evidence, at best, established a possible connection between Appellant and the bul-
lets recovered from the victirn's body."). See also U.S. v. Davis, 406 F.3d 505, 509 
(8th Cir. 2005) ("Davis's trial counsel cannot be said to be ineffective for failing to 
challenge the FBI's methodology on a basis that was not advanced by the scientific 
community at the time of trial."). 
51Solomon, supra note 49 (quoting Ken MacFadden). 
52s t . ee supra tex accompanying note 29. 
5360 Minutes: Evidence of Injustice (CBS television broadcast Nov. 18, 2007). 
54 Solomon, supra note 49, at A I ("Hundreds of defendants sitting in prisons 
nationwide have been convicted with the help of an FBI forensic tool that was 
discarded more than two years ago. But the FBI lab has yet to take steps to alert the 
affected defendants or courts, even as the window for appealing convictions is closing 
... "). 
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prisoners without attorneys.55 A few days after the 60 Minutes expose, 
Senator Patrick Leahy, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, sent a letter to the FBI Director, noting that the Bureau's letters 
gave "the false impression that these discredited tests had continuing 
reliability. "56 
Conclusion 
Several lessons can be gleaned from the CBLA experience. First, 
the failure to publish the empirical data that supports scientific conclu-
sions is unacceptable. Scientists "are generally expected to exchange 
research data as well as unique research materials that are essential 
to the replication or extension of reported findings." 57 Second, defense 
attorneys were unable to successfully challenge the evidence until 
Tobin, the retired FBI expert, became a defense witness. This is not 
surprising because no defendant, no matter how rich, can conduct 
extensive empirical studies. A defense expert in a particular case can 
critique the bases of a prosecution expert's opinion but can rarely 
replicate the research upon which that opinion rests.58 
55The Innocence Network and the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers have formed a task force and are working with the FBI to contact defense 
attorneys and convicts. See Vesna Jaksic, Faulty Bullet-test Cases Finding Way to 
Court, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 25, 2008 ("The task force is lining up pro bono commitments 
from several law firms to handle the cases."). 
56John Solomon, Leahy Pursues Forensic-Test Answers; Attorney General Is 
Told to Prepare For Senate Inquiry, Wash. Post, Nov. 22, 2007, at A2. Leahy also 
wrote: "The new revelations about bullet-lead analysis are just the latest examples of 
the Department's inadequate efforts to ensure that sound forensic testing is utilized to 
the maximum extent to find the guilty rather than merely obtain a conviction. Punishing 
the innocent is wrong and allows the guilty party to remain free." ld. 
57National Research Council, National Academies of Sciences, Responsible Sci-
ence 11 (1992). See also National Research Council, National Academies of Sciences, 
Sharing Publication-Related Data and Materials: Responsibilities of Authorship in the 
Life Sciences 4 (2003) (advocating a "uniform principle for sharing integral data and 
materials expeditiously" or UPSIDE). 
58See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert 
Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1305, 1329-30 
(2004). 
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